We formulate a noncommutative sequent calculus for partial correctness that subsumes propositional Hoare Logic. Partial correctness assertions are represented by intuitionistic linear implication. We prove soundness and completeness over relational and trace models. As a corollary, we obtain a complete sequent calculus for inclusion and equivalence of regular expressions.
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• D. Kozen and J. Tiuryn tests and correctness assertions as a uniform syntactic category. This temptation is best resisted: although both are classes of assertions, they have quite different characteristics. Tests are local assertions whose truth is determined by the current state of execution. They are normally immediately decidable. The assertion x ≥ 0, where x is a program variable, is an example of such a test. Tests occur in all modern programming languages as part of conditional expressions and looping constructs. Correctness assertions, on the other hand, are statements about the global behavior of a program, such as partial correctness or halting. They are typically much richer in expressive power than tests and undecidable in general.
DL does not distinguish between these two categories of assertions. The two are freely mixed, and both are treated classically. For this reason, the resulting system is unnecessarily complex for its purposes. The rich-test version of DL, in which one can convert an arbitrary correctness assertion to a test using the operator ?, is 1 1 -complete (see Harel et al. [2000] ). Even with systems that do make the distinction, such as KAT, care must be taken not to inadvertently treat global properties as local; doing so can lead to anomalies such as the Dead Variable Paradox [Kozen and Patron 2000] .
One major distinguishing factor between tests and correctness assertions that may not be immediately apparent is that the former are classical in nature, whereas the latter are intuitionistic. For example, the DL axiom
can be regarded as a noncommutative version of the intuitionistic currying rule
Gödel [1933] first observed the strong connection between modal and intuitionistic logic, foreshadowing Kripke's [1963 Kripke's [ , 1965 formulation of similar statebased semantics for these logics (see Artemov [2001] ). Kripke models also form the basis of the standard semantics of DL (see Harel et al. [2000] ), although, as mentioned, DL does not realize the intuitionistic nature of partial correctness.
In this article, we give a sequent calculus S that clearly separates partial correctness reasoning into its classical and intuitionistic parts. The system can be viewed as a substructural logic. These logics result from restricting the structural rules (weakening, exchange, contraction) in various ways. The interested reader is referred to Restall [2000] for a thorough introduction to substructural logics. We will explain later how some of the structural rules of the present system are restricted. In Section 4, where we introduce the system, we will explain why we view partial correctness reasoning in S as intuitionistic rather than classical.
The system has two syntactic categories: programs and formulas. Tests comprise the intersection of these two categories. Tests are Boolean combinations of propositional variables. Reasoning about tests uses classical logic.
Programs are represented by regular expressions. They are formed from atomic programs and tests with help of composition ⊗, nondeterministic choice ⊕, and iteration + . The notation for the program connectives ⊗ and ⊕ is chosen to stress their relationship to the well-known linear logic connectives: multiplicative conjunction ⊗ and additive disjunction ⊕ (see Girard [1987] ). As could be expected, ⊗ in our formalism is noncommutative.
Formulas are built from tests and programs using implication. Intuitively, formulas represent weakest preconditions or box formulas of DL. There is a syntactic restriction: an implication p → ϕ may only be formed from a program p on the left and a formula ϕ on the right. Hence, the general form of a formula is p 1 → p 2 → · · · → p n → c, where p 1 , . . . , p n are programs and c is a test. Because of this restriction and because of the severe restrictions on structural rules regarding programs, implication has a linear flavor. Also, due to the form of the rules of inference for handling implication, it follows that implication is intuitionistic.
Sequents of the system are of the form ϕ, where is a sequence of programs and formulas and ϕ is a formula. The sequence is called an environment. Programs and formulas are treated differently, as can be seen from the structural rules. There is a weakening rule for formulas, but only a very restricted weakening for programs: they can be inserted only in front of the environment. The contraction rule, although absent in the system, is derivable for formulas, but it is not derivable for programs. There is no exchange rule, although some weak forms of it can be derived. There is a co-contraction rule: a program of the form p + already present in the environment can be duplicated. Troelstra [1992, p. 25] remarks that contraction has more dramatic proof-theoretic consequences than weakening when added to Linear Logic.
The system has introduction rules for implication on the left and on the right of . Due to the asymmetrical structure of sequents, each of the program connectives has introduction and elimination rules exclusively on the left side of . In this sense, the system is neither in the style of natural deduction (introduction/elimination on the right), nor in the style of the Gentzen calculus (introduction on the left and on the right). As mentioned earlier, the system has three structural rules and a cut rule.
The article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the syntax of the language of System S. In Section 3, we give relational and trace semantics for this logic and show how the logic captures partial correctness. In Section 4, which is the main technical part of the article, we introduce the rules of System S and establish its basic properties needed later in the proof of the completeness result. The completeness proof relies on results from Kleene algebra. A relationship between System S and Kleene algebra, together with some properties used in the proof of completeness, are presented in Section 4.2. As a corollary (Proposition 4.13), we obtain a complete sequent calculus for inclusion and equivalence of regular expressions. In Section 4.3, we show two examples of valid rules for reasoning about partial correctness assertions which are not derivable in Hoare logic but are derivable in System S. Section 5 is devoted to the soundness of S and Section 6 to its completeness over both classes of models.
We mention that our two equivalent semantics of Section 3 are both special cases of a more general approach to the semantics of noncommutative Linear Logic via quantales [Yetter 1990 ]. We restrict our attention to two special kinds of quantales: sets of traces and binary relations. Our completeness result is thus 
SYNTAX
The syntax of S comprises several syntactic categories. These will require some intuitive explanation, which we defer until after the formal definition. In particular, we distinguish between two kinds of propositions, which we call tests and formulas. [Fischer and Ladner 1979] and KAT [Kozen 1997] , are based on * rather than + . We can freely move between the two languages since * and + are mutually definable:
For this reason, models for one language can be viewed as models for the other. We base S on + instead of * because the resulting deductive system is cleaner-it contains no contraction rule.
1 This is perhaps due to the fact that + can be viewed as a more primitive operation than * . A test is either an atomic test, the symbol 0 representing falsity, or an expression b → c representing classical implication, where b and c are tests. We use the symbols b, c, d , . . . exclusively to stand for tests. The set of all tests is denoted B. The sequent calculus to be presented in Section 4 will encode classical propositional logic for tests.
A program is either an atomic program, a test, or an expression p ⊕ q, p ⊗ q, or p + , where p and q are programs. We use the symbols p, q, r, . . . exclusively to stand for programs. The set of all programs is denoted P. As in PDL [Fischer and Ladner 1979] , the program operators can be used to construct conventional procedural programming constructs such as conditional tests and while loops.
A formula is either a test or an expression p → ϕ, read "after p, ϕ," where p is a program and ϕ is a formula. Intuitively, the meaning is similar to the DL modal construct [ p]ϕ. The operator → associates to the right. We use the symbols ϕ, ψ, . . . to stand for formulas.
Environments are denoted , , . . . . An environment is a (possibly empty) sequence of programs and formulas. The empty environment is denoted ε.
Intuitively, an environment describes a previous computation that has led to the current state.
Sequents are of the form ϕ, where is an environment and ϕ is a formula. We write ϕ for ε ϕ. Intuitively, the meaning of ϕ is similar to the DL assertion [ ]ϕ, where we think of the environment = . . . , p, . . . , ψ, . . . as the rich-test program · · · ; p; · · · ; ψ?; · · · of DL.
SEMANTICS

Guarded Strings
Guarded strings over P, B were introduced in Kaplan [1969] (see also Kozen and Smith [1996] ). We review the definition here.
Let B = {b 1 , . . . , b k } and P = {p 1 , . . . , p m } be fixed disjoint finite sets of atomic tests and atomic programs, respectively. An atom of B is a program 1 · · · k such that i is either b i or b i . We require, for technical reasons, that the i occur in this order. An atom represents a minimal nonzero element of the free Boolean algebra on B. We denote by A B the set of all atoms of B. For an atom α and a test b, we write α ≤ b if α → b is a classical propositional tautology.
A guarded string is a sequence
where n ≥ 0, each α i ∈ A B , and q i ∈ P. We define first(σ ) = α 0 and last(σ ) = α n . If last(σ ) = first(τ ), we can form the fusion product σ τ by concatenating σ and τ , omitting the extra copy of last(σ ) = first(τ ) in between. For example, if σ = αpβ and τ = βqγ , then σ τ = αpβqγ . If last(σ ) = first(τ ), then σ τ does not exist. The notation σ τ for fusion product should not be misinterpreted as concatenation of strings; the latter operation is not defined for guarded strings.
For sets X , Y of guarded strings, define
Although fusion product is a partial operation on guarded strings, the operation • is a total operation on sets of guarded strings. If there is no existing fusion product between an element of X and an element of
Each program p denotes a set GS( p) of guarded strings:
• D. Kozen and J. Tiuryn It follows that GS( p * ) = n≥0 GS( p) n . A guarded string σ is itself a program, and GS(σ ) = {σ }.
A set of guarded strings over P, B is regular if it is GS( p) for some program p. The regular sets of guarded strings form the free Kleene algebra with tests on generators P, B [Kozen and Smith 1996] ; in other words, GS( p) = GS(q) iff p = q is a theorem of KAT. PROOF. Closure under ∅ and union are explicit by means of the constructs 0 and ⊕. It was shown in Kaplan [1969, Theorem 5 ] (see also Kozen and Smith [1996] ) that for any program p, there is an equivalent program p such that
is the regular set of strings over the alphabet P ∪ B ∪ {b | b ∈ B} denoted by p under the usual interpretation of regular ex- 
Trace Models
Traces are similar to guarded strings but more general. They are defined in terms of Kripke frames. A Kripke frame over P, B is a structure (K , m K ), where
Although syntactically every test is a program, the primitive test symbols B and primitive program symbols P are disjoint sets, so there is no ambiguity in the definition of m K . Elements of K are called states. A trace in K is an alternating sequence of states and primitive program symbols
The first and last states of σ are denoted first(σ ) and last(σ ), respectively. If last(σ ) = first(τ ), we can fuse σ and τ to get the trace σ τ . If last(σ ) = first(τ ), then σ τ does not exist. A trace s 0 q 0 s 1 · · · s n−1 q n−1 s n is acyclic if the s i are distinct. The model K is acyclic if all traces are acyclic. It is no loss of generality to restrict attention to acyclic models; every model is equivalent to an acyclic model obtained by "unwinding" the original model (see Harel et al. [2000, p. 132] for an explicit construction).
If X and Y are sets of traces, define
Tests, programs, formulas, and environments are interpreted as sets of traces according to the following inductive definition:
It follows that
Every trace σ has an associated guarded string gs(σ ) defined by
where α i is the unique atom of B such that
The guarded string gs(σ ) is unique, because for any guarded string
valid in all trace models over P and B.
Guarded strings (Section 3.1) are just traces of a Kripke frame G whose states are atoms of B with
In the notation of this section, GS( p) would be denoted
The relationship between trace semantics and guarded strings is given by the following lemma. PROOF. Induction on the structure of p.
LEMMA 3.2. In any trace model K , for any program p and trace
τ , τ ∈ [ [ p] ] K iff gs(τ ) ∈ GS( p). In other words, [ [ p] ] K = gs −1 (GS( p)). The map X → gs −1 (X ) • D.
Relational Models
Kripke frames (K , m K ) also give rise to relational models. In a relational model, tests, programs, formulas, and environments are interpreted as binary relations on K . Tests and formulas denote subsets of the identity relation.
[
where • denotes ordinary relational composition. It follows that
thus the meaning of p → ϕ is essentially the same as the meaning of the box
is true in all states under the rich-test semantics [Fischer and Ladner 1979] , where the environment = . . . , p, . . . , ψ, . . . is interpreted as the rich-test program · · · ; p; · · · ; ψ?; · · · .
Relationship Between Trace and Relational Models
The following theorem and corollary establish the connection with the standard relational semantics of DL. 
ϕ is valid in the trace model over K .
A DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM
The rules of System S are given in Figure 1 . All rules are of the form
The sequents above the line are the premises and the sequent below the line is the conclusion. Since programs cannot occur positively on the right-hand side of , the system has introduction and elimination rules on the left of . We use the notation ϕ ambiguously as both an object and a metaassertion. As an object, it denotes a sequent, that is, a sequence of symbols over the appropriate vocabulary. As a meta-assertion, it says that the sequent ϕ is provable in S. In particular, ϕ means that the sequent ϕ is not provable in S. The proper interpretation should always be clear from context. Let us briefly explain some of the rules of S. The rule (test-cut) implies the classical nature of tests. The rule (I + ) says that, if p is partially correct with respect to the precondition ψ and the postcondition ϕ, and if ψ is an invariant for p, then the iteration p + is also partially correct with respect to the same preand postconditions. So this is clearly related to a standard rule of Hoare logic. Recall that, as far as relational models are concerned, validity of a sequent ϕ means that for every pair of states s, t, if transforms s to t, then t must satisfy ϕ. Since formulas that occur as elements of act as filters (i.e., as partial identities on states that satisfy them), it follows that we can always insert a formula in any place in the environment, since it can only reduce the number of reachable states, thereby not affecting the validity of the sequent. Thus, the full weakening rule (W ψ) for formulas is sound. On the other hand, for the same reason, a program can be inserted soundly only at the begining of the environment. This explains the difference between (W ψ) and (W p).
A rule is admissible if for any substitution instance for which the premises are provable, the conclusion is also provable. The proof of the conclusion may depend on the structure of the expressions substituted for the metasymbols appearing in the rule or on the proofs of the premises. To show admissibility, it suffices to derive the conclusion in S augmented with the premises as extra axioms, considering the metasymbols appearing in the rule as atomic symbols in the object language. Any such derivation will then be uniformly valid over all substitution instances. For example, the following contraction rule
is admissible in S. Indeed, below is a derivation of the conclusion from the premise of (C ψ).
where the sequent ψ ψ is derivable by Lemma 4.2. Note that the above derivation depends on . Also, as can be seen from the proof Lemma 4.2, the derivation of ψ ψ depends on ψ.
Basic Properties
LEMMA 4.1. The rule
PROOF. We have the following derivation. Note that , 0, ϕ is an instance of (I 0).
LEMMA 4.2. The rule and sequent
PROOF. The following diagram gives a proof of (mono).
The identity sequent (ident) follows by induction on the structure of ϕ using (mono). The basis b b is an instance of the axiom. LEMMA 4.3. The rules
PROOF. For (ER →), we have ϕ ϕ by Lemma 4.2. The following figure gives the remainder of the derivation.
To derive (W 0), the sequent , 0, p 0 is an instance of (I 0). Applying (cut) to this and the premise 0 yields the desired conclusion.
•
D. Kozen and J. Tiuryn
The rule (ER →) plays the role of Modus Ponens. It is clearly an elimination rule on the right. We cannot write a real Modus Ponens rule in the present system, since a programs cannot stay to the right of . If this were allowed, (ER →) and Modus Ponens would have been easily interderivable. See also the proof of Lemma 4.4.
We wish to pause and discuss briefly why we view partial correctness reasoning in S as intuitionistic rather than classical. It is not immediately obvious, since formulas are of the form p 1 → · · · → p n → b, where p 1 , . . . , p n are programs and b is a test. In particular, formulas are not closed under implication. But we can argue that the implication in the formula p → ϕ has an intuitionistic flavor by considering the rules that introduce implication. Rule (R →) is a typical rule of introduction of implication on the right of . Rule (I →) is not so typical, but it can be shown that this rule is derivable from (ident), (ER →), (W ψ), (W p), and (cut) as follows.
. . . .
Since each of the rules used in the above derivation clearly has an intuitionistic flavor, it follows that (I →) has as well.
Next, we show that S is powerful enough to prove all classically valid tests.
LEMMA 4.4. For tests b, c, the sequent b c is derivable in S whenever b → c is a classical propositional tautology.
PROOF. It is well known (see Harel et al. [2000] and Johnstone [1987] ) that the following proof system is complete for classical propositional logic:
We show that (MP)-(DN) are derivable in S. For (MP),
.
Finally, for (DN),
This completes the proof.
LEMMA 4.5. The rule
PROOF. Immediate from (I
LEMMA 4.6. The rules
PROOF. By straightforward derivations involving (cut), it suffices to show that both pq → ψ p → q → ψ and p → q → ψ pq → ψ. For the former, starting with pq → ψ pq → ψ, apply (ER →) and (E ⊗) to get pq → ψ, p, q ψ, then apply (R →) twice. For the latter, starting with ψ ψ, apply (W p) twice to get p, q, ψ ψ, then apply (I →) twice to get p → q → ψ, p, q ψ. The result then follows from (I ⊗) and (R →). PROOF. The formula q 1 → · · · → q n → b is equivalent to q 1 · · · q n b → 0. The proof of this fact is quite easy using Lemma 4.6 and is left to the reader.
Relation to Kleene Algebra
We show in this section that S induces a left-handed Kleene algebra structure on programs. The main result of this section, Proposition 4.13, relates provability • D. Kozen and J. Tiuryn in System S with containment of regular sets of guarded strings. It plays the key role in the completeness proof of System S (Theorem 6.1).
Recall that a Kleene algebra (KA) is an idempotent semiring such that p * q is the least solution to q + px ≤ x and qp * is the least solution to q + xp ≤ x. Equivalently, a Kleene algebra is a structure (K , +, ·, * , 0, 1) satisfying the following axioms. Boffa [1990 Boffa [ , 1995 , based on results of Krob [1991] , shows that for the equational theory of the regular sets, the right-hand rule (3) is unnecessary. We call an idempotent semiring satisfying (1) and (2) a left-handed Kleene algebra. Boffa's result says that for regular expressions p and q, R( p) = R(q) iff p = q is a logical consequence of the axioms of left-handed Kleene algebra, where R is the usual interpretation of regular expressions as sets of strings. More specifically, Krob [1991] shows that the classical equations of Conway [1971] , along with a certain infinite but independently characterized set of axioms, logically entail all identities of the regular sets over P. The classical equations of Conway are the axioms of idempotent semirings, the equations (1), and the equations
Boffa [1990, 1995] actually shows that these equations plus the rule
-which, the reader will note, is neither left-nor right-handed-imply all the axioms of Krob; therefore, the classical equations of Conway plus Boffa's rule (4) are complete for the equational theory of the regular sets over P. The classical equations and Boffa's rule are all easily shown to be theorems of left-handed KA.
Our first task is to extend these results to Kleene algebra with tests (KAT) and guarded strings. First, let us recall that Kleene algebra with tests is a Kleene algebra with an embedded Boolean subalgebra. Formally, it is a twosorted algebra (K , B, +, ·, * , , 0, 1) such that -(K , +, ·, * , 0, 1) is a Kleene algebra -(B, +, ·, , 0, 1) is a Boolean algebra -(B, +, ·, 0, 1) is a subalgebra of (K , +, ·, 0, 1).
LEMMA 4.8. Left-handed KAT is complete for the equational theory of the regular sets of guarded strings over P and B. In other words, for every pair of programs p, q in the language of KAT, GS(p) = GS(q) if and only if the equation p = q is a logical consequence of the axioms of left-handed KAT.
PROOF. We adapt an argument of Kozen and Smith [1996] , in which the same result was proved for KAT with both the left-and right-hand rule. It was shown there that for any program p, there is an equivalent program p such that
is a theorem of KAT, and (ii) GS( p) = R( p), where R( p)
is the regular set of strings over the alphabet P ∪ B ∪ {b | b ∈ B} denoted by p under the usual interpretation of regular expressions.
In other words, any p can be transformed by the axioms of KAT to another program p such that the set of guarded strings denoted by p is the same as the set of strings denoted by p. Now to show completeness of KAT over guarded strings, Kozen and Smith [1996] argued as follows: Suppose GS( p) = GS(q). Then
R( p) = GS( p) = GS( p) = GS(q) = GS( q) = R( q).
Since KA is complete for the equational theory of the regular sets, p = q is a theorem of KA. Combining this with (i) for p and q implies that p = q is a theorem of KAT.
To adapt this to the present situation, we observe that p = q is a theorem of left-handed KA by the results of Boffa and Krob. Thus in order to complete the proof, we need only ascertain that the right-hand rule (3) is not needed in the proof of p = p. This does not follow from Boffa's and Krob's results, since the argument is in KAT, not KA. However, a perusal of Kozen and Smith [1996] reveals that the proof of p = p uses neither the left-nor the right-hand rule, but can be carried out using only the classical equations of Conway and the axioms of Boolean algebra.
We now describe the left-handed KAT structure induced by S. For programs p, q we define p q if q → ϕ p → ϕ is admissible; that is, if q → ϕ p → ϕ is provable for all ϕ. Define p ≡ q if p q and q p. The relation is a preorder, therefore ≡ is an equivalence relation and is a partial order on ≡-classes. Reflexivity is (ident) (Lemma 4.2) and transitivity follows from a • D. Kozen and J. Tiuryn single application of (cut). The relation is a proof-theoretic approximation of the relation of containment of the input-output relations denoted by programs p, q. Indeed, if in all models the meaning of p is always contained in the meaning of q, then for every post-condition ϕ, if p is partially correct with respect to ϕ, then so is q. In other words, the sequent q → ϕ p → ϕ is valid. It turns out that this approximation is strong enough to induce a left-handed KAT structure on ≡-classes of programs.
LEMMA 4.9. The operators ⊕ and ⊗ are monotone with respect to . That is, if p q, then p ⊕ r q ⊕ r, pr qr, and r p rq.
PROOF. The rules (E1 ⊕), (E2 ⊕), and (I ⊕) imply that p ⊕ q is the -least upper bound of p and q modulo ≡. The monotonicity of ⊕ follows by equational reasoning:
For ⊗, we must show that if q → ϕ p → ϕ for any ϕ, then qr → ϕ pr → ϕ and rq → ϕ rp → ϕ for any ϕ. Using (cut), (curry), and (uncurry) (Lemma 4.6), it suffices to show that q → r → ϕ p → r → ϕ and r → q → ϕ r → p → ϕ for any ϕ. The former is immediate from the assumption, and the latter follows from (mono) (Lemma 4.2). PROOF. Certainly pby monotonicity. Then
LEMMA 4.11. Let P/≡ denote the set of ≡-equivalence classes. The operations ⊕, ⊗, and * are well defined on P/≡, and the quotient structure (P/≡, ⊕, ⊗, * , 0, 1) is a left-handed KA.
PROOF. We must argue that all the following properties hold:
These are just the laws of left-handed KA written with the symbols of S.
To derive the distributive law
All the other axioms of idempotent semirings follow in an equally straightforward manner. Since ⊕ and ⊗ are monotone with respect to (Lemma 4.9), they are well defined on ≡-classes.
The inequality p + p + p + follows from (CC + ) by:
The inequality p p + follows from (E + ) in a similar fashion. Monotonicity of + and * then follow from Lemma 4.10 by equational reasoning:
We now prove the KA identities involving * . Arguing equationally, we have 
The identities p + ≡ p ⊕ p + p and 1 ⊕ p * p ≡ p * are obtained in a similar fashion.
• D. Kozen and J. Tiuryn It remains to show p⇒ p *. This is established by the following derivation:
. 
) is a left-handed KAT and is isomorphic to the algebra of regular sets of guarded strings over P and B. Thus, for any programs p and q, p q iff GS( p) ⊆ GS(q) and p ≡ q iff GS( p) = GS(q).
PROOF. In order to show that (P/≡, B/≡, ⊕, ⊗, * , , 0, 1) is a left-handed KAT, by Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12, it remains to show that ⊗ coincides in B/≡ with the greatest lower bound and that ⊕ coincides with the least upper bound. The greatest lower bound in B/≡ of two equivalence classes with representatives b and c is the equivalence class of b → c, while their least upper bound is the equivalence class of b → c. Hence, we have to prove the following two equivalences.
We start with (5). Since b → b → c is a propositional tautology, it follows from Lemma 4.4 that b b → c is derivable. Hence
In a similar way, since c → b → c is a propositional tautology, we derive the sequent (b → c) → ϕ, c ϕ. Hence, by (I ⊕) and (R →), we obtain
The opposite inequality is established by the following derivation. [Kozen and Smith 1996, Lemma 5] , GS( p) ⊆ GS(q).
Incompleteness of Hoare Logic
The partial correctness assertion {b} p {c} of HL is encoded in S by the formula b → p → c. The Hoare-style rule
is encoded by the sequent
It follows from Theorem 6.1 that all relationally valid rules of this form are derivable in S; this is false for HL (see Kozen [2000] and Kozen and Tiuryn [2001] ). We give two examples of this situation. First let us remark that every relationally valid partial correctness assertion {b} p {c} is derivable in Hoare logic. Recall that we are dealing with a propositional formalism, hence the incompleteness arguments for first-order Hoare logic do not apply here. Derivability in Hoare logic of relationally valid partial correctness assertions follows from a more general result. It is shown in [Kozen and Tiuryn 2001, Theorem 4 .1] that every relationally valid rule (7) in which the programs p 1 , . . . , p n are atomic is derivable in Hoare logic. Since a single partial correctness assertion is a special case of rule (7) for n = 0, the above remark follows. Thus, we have to look for examples of relationally valid rules (7) with non-atomic premises. One such rule, mentioned in Kozen and Tiuryn [2001] , that is relationally valid but not derivable in Hoare logic is
The sequent of S corresponding to (8) 
Here is a derivation of this sequent:
The first sequent in the above derivation is an instance of (ident) (Lemma 4.2).
Another example of a relationally valid rule which is not derivable in HL is
The reason that the above rule cannot be derived is the same as for (8): it is easy to show by induction on proofs in Hoare logic that no conclusion with an atomic program can be derived from non-atomic premises. The program if b then p else p is encoded in S by bp ⊕ bp. Here is a derivation in S of the sequent corresponding to the rule (9):
SOUNDNESS THEOREM 5.1. If ϕ is provable, then it is valid in all trace and relational models.
PROOF. By Corollary 3.4, we need only to show soundness over trace models. This is easily established by induction on proofs in S with one case for each proof rule. We argue the cases (cut) and (I →) explicitly.
For (cut), we need to show that
Using monotonicity of •,
For (I →), we want to show that if
It suffices to show that
The other cases are equally straightforward.
6. COMPLETENESS Finally, we argue the induction step in which the environment ends with a formula, say , ψ ϕ. By Lemma 4.7, we can rewrite this as , q → 0 p → 0. Let w be an expression representing the set of all guarded strings (see Lemma 3.1). Let r and s be programs such that GS(r) = GS( p) ∩ GS(qw) and GS(s) = GS( p) − GS(qw). These programs exist by Lemma 3.1, and GS( p) = GS(r ⊕ s). By Proposition 4.13, we can replace p by r ⊕ s to get , q → 0 r ⊕ s → 0. By (R →), , q → 0, r ⊕ s 0, and by (I ⊕), either , q → 0, r 0 or , q → 0, s 0. But it cannot be the former, since , q → 0, q, w 0, therefore , q → 0 qw → 0, and by Proposition 4.13, r qw, therefore by (cut), , q → 0 r → 0. Thus, it must be the case that , q → 0, s 0, so , q → 0 s → 0. By weakening, we have s → 0. Then, by the induction hypothesis, there exist an acyclic trace model K and traces σ ∈ 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
It has recently been shown that deciding whether a given sequent is valid is PSPACE-complete [Kozen 2001 ]. Several interesting questions present themselves for further investigation.
(1) The completeness proof relies on the results of Boffa [1990 Boffa [ , 1995 , which are based in turn on the results of Krob [1991] . Krob's proof is fairly involved, comprising an entire journal issue. One would like to have a proof of completeness based on first principles. (2) The relative expressive and deductive power of S compared with similar systems such as KAT, PDL, and PHL is not completely understood. S is at least as expressive as PHL and the equational theory of KAT, and apparently more so, since it is not clear how to express general sequents ϕ 1 , p 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . , p n−1 , ϕ n ψ in PHL or KAT. On the other hand, it is not clear how to express general Horn formulas of KA such as px = xq → p * x = xq * in S. (3) Application of the linear implication operator → is limited to programs on the left-hand side and formulas on the right-hand side. It would be interesting to see whether more general forms correspond to anything useful and whether the system can be extended to handle them. The operator → is a form of residuation (see Pratt [1990] and Kozen [1994] ), and this connection bears further investigation. Also the issue of cut elimination in such a more general system seems to be an interesting problem. A more general implication would possibly allow the formulation of a system more in the style of Gentzen than System S. (4) We would like to extend S to handle liveness properties and total correctness. (5) We would like to undertake a deeper investigation into the structure of proofs with an eye toward establishing normal form and cut elimination theorems. It can be shown that the sequent (b ⊕ b) → ϕ ϕ cannot be derived in S without both (cut) and (test-cut). Presumably, it cannot be derived without (test-cut). We do not know whether there are valid sequents that are not derivable in S without (cut).
